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This blog re-examines the notion that the EU is “bullying” the UK by 
failing to make concessions, even though it appears to be in their own 
economic best interest. Far from being inflexible, internal weaknesses 
mean that the EU is simply unable to offer greater flexibility to a non-
member than its own member states. As such, German industry will 
not ride to the rescue, forcing the EU to make concessions and failure 
to properly appreciate the internal constraints faced by the EU mean 
that the UK government risks leaving the EU without a withdrawal 
agreement. As such, Dominic Raab’s recent assertion that the EU 
needs to “get serious” in Brexit negotiations reflects a lack of 
understanding of the constraints faced by his negotiating partners. If 
adopted in official negotiations, this perspective runs the risk of adding 
unnecessary antagonism to an already complicated set of talks and, 
ultimately, failing to secure a much-needed withdrawal agreement. 
Media reports suggest that Michel Barnier has confidentially informed 
MEPs that Brexit talks are now “frozen”[1] and preparations on the 
continent for a no-deal Brexit are being accelerated. This is in stark 
contrast to official UK government documentation, which claims that 
“A scenario in which the UK leaves the EU without agreement (a ‘no 
deal’ scenario) remains unlikely given the mutual interests of the UK 
and the EU in securing a negotiated outcome”[2]. 
The latter appears to be an article of faith on the part of the UK 
government and represents at best a rather naïve misreading of the 
payoffs for each side. In game theoretic terms, the UK government 
appears to believe (and is behaving as if it believes) that it is engaged 
in a game of chicken. Whilst it is true that the UK is vastly more 
exposed to Brexit than most of Europe[3], it is also true that the 
economic losses for the EU from a no deal Brexit are likely to be 
substantial (see, for example, the work of the think-tank Oxford 
Economics Oxford Economics [4]). As such, there is surely a strong 
incentive to avoid such an outcome on both sides and the only reason 
for a “no deal” scenario to unfold is a miscalculation. There is thus 
zero incentive for the UK government to make any concessions prior 
to the last possible moment. 
As stated, I believe this fundamentally misreads the game. The EU is 
externally strong but internally weak. Many have noted that the EU is 
in a strong negotiating position, both because of its size and because 
the UK wishes to retain access to (and membership of) large parts of 
the European project. The EU is one of very few political actors large 
enough to be able to go toe-to-toe with Trump’s America and Xi 
Jinping’s China in international negotiations. Ironically, if it really did 
feel in a strong negotiating position then there would be no reason for 
the EU not to come to an accord with the UK. After all, the UK 
government appears to desire to remain within the Single Market for 
goods – which would also benefit the EU. The indivisibility of the 
Single Market is, according to this view, merely “dogma”[5]. The EU’s 
failure to offer the UK a satisfactory “deal” along these lines is, 
according to this view, evidence of a desire to “punish” the UK – a line 
taken by much of the Eurosceptic press in the UK. 
I argue, however, that this external strength masks dramatic internal 
weakness. After all, if the EU were really seen as such a valuable 
construct by all member states (and their populations), then there 
would be no reason to insist on the indivisibility of the Single Market. If 
everyone sees the value of the whole package then why not allow the 
UK to cherry-pick just parts of it? The reality, of course, is that large 
parts of the package are deeply unpopular in a number of member 
states. 
Large numbers of French and Italians have reservations about state-
aid regulations (and, given widespread perceptions around their 
proclivity to find ways of avoiding such restrictions, these reservations 
appear to be shared by many within the state apparatus). Similarly, 
German trade integration for services is one of the lowest in the EU 
and much of Europe appears to have reservations around freedom of 
movement of people (but, of course, we all enjoy freedom of 
movement for ourselves!) Indeed, it is a deep irony that the UK was 
one of only 3 countries to immediately grant EU citizens from Eastern 
European unfettered access to its labour market in 2004. The then 
leader of the German opposition – Angela Merkel – famously argued 
that even the 7 year period during which such migrants were denied 
full access to Germany’s labour market was not good enough[6]. 
Today, the EU faces a populist revolt on many fronts. Parts of the 
Italian government are deeply Eurosceptic and are openly defying 
Brussels’ desire for budgetary restraint. In France, Marine Le Pen (no 
friend of the European Union) won over 1/3 of the vote in the second 
round of France’s 2017 presidential election. There are serious 
threats to the rule of law in both Poland and Hungary and even 
Sweden – long held up as a bastion of Nordic tolerance – is facing 
political uncertainty after the meteoric rise of the far-right. The populist 
forces represented by Brexit are not the exception: they are the rule. 
As a result, for better or for worse, these internal weaknesses mean 
that the EU is unable to concede on the integrity of the Single Market. 
After all, if it allowed the UK to carve out only those parts of the Single 
Market that it liked what incentive would Italy or France have to 
adhere to those parts of the Single Market that large parts of their 
populations are sceptical of? No wonder then that there is a 
consensus amongst many European leaders that a cliff edge (no deal) 
Brexit would be preferable to damaging the EU’s Single Market[1]. The 
EU is not playing chicken, its playing for survival. Unless they’re 
careful, the UK’s political leaders may take us to the cliff-edge and 
drive right over it. 
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